Indiana has two statutes which may diminish or reduce subrogation liens. The first is I.C. 34-53-1-2. This statutes deals with the reduction of a subrogation lien by the pro-rata share of attorney fees and costs of litigation. The second is I.C. 34-51-2-19. This statute mandates the reduction of a subrogation lien due to the comparative fault of the insured or by reason of uncollectability. These two statutes are used often by Indiana attorneys to help maximize the recovery for their clients in personal injury cases. If the case was resolved by settlement rather than by a jury trial and the fault allocation or damage amount is in dispute, the injured party may file a declaratory judgment action against the lien holder in order to have the court make a judicial determination of the fault or amount of damages.

The Indiana Supreme Court held in Department of Pub. Welfare v. Couch, 605 N.E.2d 165, (Ind. 1992) that I.C. 34-53-1-2 applied to cases in which the Welfare Department was asserting a lien. This concept was reaffirmed by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Pedraza by Pedraza v. Grande 712 N.E.2d 1007 (Ind.Ct. App. 1999).

The conclusion by a Social Security Administrative Law Judge that fibromyalgia must not be a debilitating impairment when “practically all tests have been normal” is not an uncommon error. As Judge Chief Judge Posner wrote in Sarchet v. Charter, 78 F.3d 305, 306 (7th Cir. 1996), fibromyalgia is a:

“common, but elusive and mysterious, disease. . . its cause or causes are unknown, there is no cure, and, of greatest importance to disability law, its symptoms are entirely subjective. There are no laboratory tests for the presence or severity of fibromyalgia. The principal symptoms are “pain all over,” fatigue, disturbed sleep, stiffness, and–the only symptom that discriminates between it and other diseases of a rheumatic character–multiple tender spots, more precisely 18 fixed locations on the body (and the rule of thumb is that the patient must have at least 11 of them to be diagnosed as having fibromyalgia) that when pressed firmly cause the patient to flinch.”

Judge Posner also noted that the Administrative Law Judge in Sarchet exhibited a “pervasive misunderstanding of the disease” by “depreciate[ing] the gravity of Sarchet’s fibromyalgia because of the lack of any evidence of objectively discernible symptoms, such as swelling of the joints.”

The Supreme Court of Nevada in the case of Lioce v. Cohen et al., 149 P3d 916 (Nevada 2006) held that the defense attorney’s arguments based upon jury nullification, personal opinion regarding the justness of a plaintiff’s case and invoking the golden rule argument amounted to attorney misconduct.

In four different personal injury trials in Nevada, a defense attorney made similar arguments during the trial. These arguments included an attempt at “jury nullification” [the Nevada Supreme Court defined jury nullification as “[a] jury’s knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to apply the law either because the jury wants to send a message about some social issue that is larger than the case itself or because the result dictated by law is contrary to the jury’s sense of justice, morality, or fairness.” Black’s Law Dictionary 875 (8th ed. 2004). Examples include arguments that these cases wasted taxpayers’ money and jurors’ time. The defense attorney also argued that the cases were examples of people “looking for an excuse to sue someone at the drop of a hat” and that society now believed that “Americans have become a society of blamers.”

The Court also found that the defense attorney impermissibly injected his personal opinion about the justness of plaintiffs’ causes when he said that he had “a real passion for [these] case[s] and cases like [them],” because these were the types of cases that cause people to be distrustful of lawyers and legitimate plaintiffs and lead to what the defense attorney argued was the public’s negative perception of the legal system.

Despite the Indiana Supreme Court’s recent decision in Glotzbach v. Froman, 854 N.E.2d 337 (Ind.2006), in which the Court held that there is no third party cause of action for spoliation against an employer of the injured party, Indiana still recognizes the cause of action of third party spoliation cases. The right of an injured party to bring claim for third party spoliation was first recognized by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Thompson v. Owensby, 704 N.E.2d 134 (Ind.1998) trans. denied. The Thompson case is particularly important to me because I was the attorney who argued before the Indiana Court of Appeals and then the Indiana Supreme Court that Indiana Insurance Company, whose adjuster lost the dog leash which was the subject of a product claim, should be liable for Nicole’s inability to prove her product claim against the manufacturer.

In Thompson, Nicole was severely bitten by a neighbor’s dog as she rode her bike down her street. The dog had a history of being vicious. That is the reason that his owners had leashed him inside a fenced yard. The dog broke the leash, ran out of the fenced yard, onto the street and attacked Nicole. Indiana Insurance Company, the insurer for the dog owners, took control of the defective leash when it learned of Nicole’s claim. During the course of the investigation, it lost the leash. We added the insurance company to the tort action against the property owners and claimed that to the extent Nicole was unable to prove her case of a defective product against the manufacturer due to the fact that the product was no longer available, then the insurance company should be responsible for what Nicole’s case would have brought had the absent leash were present.

The Indiana Court of Appeals found that there was a special duty on the part of the insurance company to preserve evidence. To do so, the court found that there was a special relationship between the claimant and the insurance company, that the harm involved in loss of evidence was foreseeable and that the recognition of duty is consistent with Indiana’s policy of accountability. The court wrote “[liability insurance carriers are no strangers to litigation, and it strains credulity to posit in a motion to dismiss that a liability carrier could be unaware of the potential importance of physical evidence..”

The Indiana Supreme Court, has a 2-2 tie vote on whether to accept transfer on Thompson. As a result, Thompson became the law in Indiana.

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Fibromyalgia syndrome is a terrible disease that afflicts at least 5 million U.S. residents. It is characterized by chronic widespread pain, fatigue, sleep disturbance, stiffness, impaired memory and concentration, anxiety and depression. Even though the American College of Rheumatology recognizes the disease of fibromyalgia the Social Security Administration has been slow to accept it as justification to find a claimant disabled.

Chief Judge Posner of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Court wrote in Sarchet v. Charter, 78 F.3d 305, 306 (7th Cir. 1996) that fibromyalgia could be the basis for an award of disability. Judge Posner described fibromyalgia as a:

“common, but elusive and mysterious, disease. . . its cause or causes are unknown, there is no cure, and, of greatest importance to disability law, its symptoms are entirely subjective. There are no laboratory tests for the presence or severity of fibromyalgia. The principal symptoms are “pain all over,” fatigue, disturbed sleep, stiffness, and–the only symptom that discriminates between it and other diseases of a rheumatic character–multiple tender spots, more precisely 18 fixed locations on the body (and the rule of thumb is that the patient must have at least 11 of them to be diagnosed as having fibromyalgia) that when pressed firmly cause the patient to flinch.”

Call your insurance agent as soon as possible after an accident.

Do not admit responsibility. Exchanging information and giving facts in not the same thing as admitting responsibility! you may think that you were responsible for the accident and later learn that the other driver caused it or that the other driver was equally at fault.

See your doctor. It is always wise to have a physical exam after an accident. Your doctor may recognize injuries, sometimes serious, that are not apparent to you.

When an accident results in injury or death, each driver involved must:

1. Immediately stop as close to the accident scene as possible without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.

2. Remain at the scene until: a) the driver has given his or her name and address and registration of the vehicle; b) if requested; the driver has shown his or her license to the driver or passengers of the other vehicle; and c) reasonable assistance has been given to each person injured in the accident including the removal, or making arrangements for removal, of the injured to a doctor or hospital.

When an accident occurs with an unattended vehicle, the driver must:

1. Immediately stop as close to the accident scene as possible without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.

2. Locate and notify the owner or driver of the vehicle of the name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle striking the unattended vehicle.

When an accident results in damage to something other than another vehicle, the driver must:

1. Immediately stop as close to the accident scene as possible without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.

2. Remain at the scene until: a) the driver has taken reasonable steps to locate and notify the owner or person in change of the property that is damaged; b) the driver has given that person his or her name, address and registration; and c) if requested, the driver has shown his or her license to the person.

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