The mental condition known as “anxiety” can also serve as the basis to obtain Social Security disability benefits. What is anxiety? How serious does anxiety have to be in order to qualify as a disability?

“Anxiety” is a normal reaction to stress. It is part of mental makeup which is designed to help us cope with difficult situations. For example, speaking in public, playing in competitive sports even taking an examination. Normally, experiences of stress are brief and mild. During the experience of stress, our senses become sharper and our focus more intense. But for some, experiences of stress last much longer, is far too intense and begins to interfere with normal daily activities. These people encounter what many view as normal and routine activities with dread and an irrational fear. It is then that anxiety crosses the line to an anxiety disorder.

It is estimated that 40 million adult Americans suffer with some form of anxiety disorder. There are several different types of anxiety disorders. The specific type depends upon the presentation of clinical features. While no two anxiety disorders are alike they do have in common a dread and irrational fear of the common place. Among the more specific diagnosis are: panic disorder; obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD); post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and social anxiety disorder.

On June 17, 2010, the U.S. Treasury issued a proposed rule to require that all payments to claimants whose claims for disability benefits are filed on or after March 1, 2011 be paid by direct deposit, thereby eliminating paper checks.

Many claimants have chosen already to receive their payments by direct deposit. For those who have chosen this option, direct deposit would continue.

Under the proposed rule, individuals who have not chosen to do direct deposit of their payments to an account at a financial institution would be enrolled in the Direct Express® Debit MasterCard® card program, a prepaid card program established pursuant to terms and conditions approved by Financial Management Services.

The Social Security Administration (SSA) has listed the condition commonly known as “depression” as a basis to obtain Social Security disability benefits. Depression is actually under a broader category of mental impairments called “Affective Disorders”. So what are “Affective Disroders”?

“Affective Disorders” is a psychiatric term used to describe a mental condition with multiple sides or faces which affects a person physically, mentally, socially and behaviorally. Commonly included within this disorder are major depressive disorders, bipolar disorders and anxiety disorders. Major Depressive Disorder (also known as “monopolar depression” as opposed to “bipolar depression”) has as its hallmark an all-encompassing low mood accompanied by low self-esteem, and loss of interest or pleasure in normally enjoyable activities.

In order to meet the listing for depression (Listing 12.04), SSA must first find that the disease has at least 4 of the following 9 symptoms are present: 1. anhedonia, or pervasive loss of interest in almost all activities; 2. appetite disturbance with change in weight; 3. sleep disturbance; 4. psychomotor agitation or retardation; 5. decreased energy; 6. feelings of guilt or worthlessness; 7. thoughts of suicide; 8. difficulty concentrating or thinking; or 9. hallucinations, delusions or paranoid thinking.

Over the next several blog entries, the topic of mental illnesses in Social Security Disability Cases will be discussed. Many people have asked whether depression, anxiety (which includes panic disorders, post traumatic stress, obsessive/compulsive disorder and agoraphobia) and bi polar disorder can serve as the basis for an award of social security disability. The short answer is yes, mental disorders can make a person disabled.

According to the National Institute Mental Health, mental disorders are the leading cause of disability in the U.S. That said, a diagnosis by itself does not necessarily mean that a person is disabled. For example, an estimated 26.2 percent of Americans ages 18 and older — about one in four adults — suffer from a diagnosable mental disorder in a given year. That is over 57 million citizens. However, not every one of these person is disabled.

Make no mistake, the federal regulations for social security disability do allow for a finding of disability for mental illnesses. The blogs that follow will explore what the criteria is for a finding of disability based on mental disorders.

Over the years, I have heard people remark that so and so received disability benefits because of a drug or alcohol addiction. In fact, many believe that the law provides for the granting of disability to addicts. The law is far more complicated.

Before 1994, a person could receive disability benefits if he or she were disabled because of an addiction. In 1994, Congress required that persons whose addiction was material to being disabled must undergo treatment, that their benefits be limited to 36 months (during that treatment) and that the benefits could be suspended if there was non-compliance with treatment.

In 1996, Congress again changed the law for folks whose addiction was a “contributing factor material to the finding of disability.” Disability benefits for these people were prohibited. The bottom line is that if a drug or alcohol addiction exists and if that addiction were to stop the person could return to work, then no disability benefits can be awarded. If it is impossible to state which limitations remain after stopping, then it is appropriate to find that the drug/alcohol addiction is not material.

The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently decided in the case of Hillebrand v. Large, 914 N.E.2d 846 (Ind. Ct. App.) that “the damages awarded in a wrongful death action may include the reasonable attorney fees necessary to pursue the action, and these damages inure to the exclusive benefit of the estate for the payment of such costs. The remainder of the damages inure to the exclusive benefit of a nondependent parent or nondependent child of the decedent in accordance with I.C. § 34-23-1-2(d).”

The representative of the estate was confused whether the Indiana Wrongful Death statute allowed for the deduction of attorney fees incurred for the recovery of wrongful death proceeds,from the settlement or from the estate itself. While there appeared to be enough funds in the estate from which to pay the attorney fees, the sole beneficiary to the wrongful death case did not wish to have the attorney fees deducted from his settlement funds. In this opinion, the court made it clear that the statute for wrongful death had been written broad enough to encompass the legislative intent to paying all costs related to a wrongful death claim, including attorney fees.

In Pfenning v. Lineman et al., 2010 Ind. App. LEXIS 164, the Court of Appeals of Indiana, expanded the doctrine of no duty from one participant in a sporting event to another to include not just the players, coaches and those sitting on the bench to also include volunteers at the sporting event.

16 year old Cassie Pfenning was asked by her grandfather, Jerry Jones, to accompanying him to a golf tournament at which Mr. Jones had volunteered to drive a beverage cart. Mr. Jones ended up playing in the tournament so he left Cassie with his sister. His sister too decided to play in the tournament so she was left in the care of yet another person, Christie Edwards. Cassie drove the cart while Ms. Edwards severed beer to the golfers. While Cassie was on the 18th hole cart path, she was hit by an golf ball which was the result of an errant drive from the 17th tee. As a consequence, Cassie sustained serious personal injuries.

Cassie’s mother sought to recover on behalf of Cassie, under a number of different theories, against the golf course, the tournament sponsor and her grandfather. The trial court granted summary judgment as to all defendants. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed the trial court. In doing so, the Court of Appeals of Indiana wrote: “Although not a player herself, she clearly was ‘part of the sporting event. . . involved,’ and we hereby expand the language in Geiersbach to include sporting event volunteers such as Pfenning. Geiersbach 807 N.E.2d at 120.

The Federal Register published on December 14, 2009 a change to the Endocrine Listing (Listing 9) proposed by the Social Security Administration (SSA). SSA proposed that the impairments set out in Listing 9 be eliminated. Listing 9 includes not only thyroid disorders but also diabetes. The elimination proposal by SSA is based upon what SSA considers to be “advances in medical treatment in the detection” of endocrine disorders. As a consequence of these advances SSA believes that these types of disorders no longer meet the 12 month durational requirement.

SSA has also indicated that it has been advised by medical experts that the current listing regarding diabetes reflects “only inadequate glucose regulation.” SSA has been told by these experts that adequate glucose regulation is achievable with improved treatment options. If SSA ultimately decides to change the regulation as proposed, then severe impairments such as diabetes and thyroid disorders will no longer serve as a basis to obtain Social Security Disability benefits on on their own. If endocrine disorders cause problems of listing-level severity in other organs or glands, SSA will “evaluate these effects under other body system listings.”

Importantly, current beneficiaries who have received an award of Social Security disability benefits based upon endocrine disorders will not be terminated. They will, however, continue to be evaluated for medical improvement by continuing disability reviews but under the original listing upon which their initial entitlement was based.

Under Indiana’s Child Wrongful Death Act (I.C. 34-23-2-1) a parent may recover for the loss of child killed by the negligence of another. There is no cap under the Child Wrongful Death Act. There is however, a cap under the Adult Wrongful Death Act (I.C. 34-23-1-2) for love and companionship at $300,000. Because of this cap, the question of when a “child” is a “child” for wrongful death purposes becomes important.

The Child Wrongful Death Act defines a child as an unmarried individual without dependents who is either less than 20 years of age or less than 23 years of age and is enrolled in a post secondary educational institution or a career and technical education school or program that is not a post secondary educational program.In the case of Howard v. E&B Paving, Inc., et al 2010 Ind. App. LEXIS 55, the Court of Appeals of Indiana decided what was meant in the statute by “enrolled in a post secondary educational institution”.

Amber Howard was over 20 but under 23 years of age when she died from injuries which she received an automobile crash on November 13, 2002. Amber’s parent’s filed a wrongful death claim under the Child Wrongful Death Act. The issue was whether Amber a “child” under the Child Wrongful Death Act.

On January 27, 2010, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the period of time that the immunity for loses caused by temporary weather lasts is “at least until the weather condition has stabilized”. The high court also held that during this time period, the governmental unit is immunized for liability for alleged flaws in its remedial steps. In the case of Bules v. Marshall County, 2010 LEXIS 62, Robert Bules and his son Brian were injured in a single truck crash when Robert drove into high water on a road and lost control of his truck. Robert and Brain sued Marshall County alleging negligent warning of the dangerous road conditions. There was a sign placed close to the water on the road. Robert claims that the sign was too close to the hazard to make a difference. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the county. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court granted transfer.

Justice Boehm, in writing for the Court, indicated that the statute in question, I.C. 34-13-3-3(3), [“A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employer’s employment is not liable if a loss results from: (3) The temporary condition of a public thoroughfare. . .that results from weather.”] requires that the loss result from a condition that is both “temporary” and “caused by weather.” The Court noted that during the time that the government is in the process of responding to a weather condition, this immunity “extends to all claims caused by that condition during the period of reasonable response, whether the alleged injury occurred early or late in the response.”

The Court found that there was no issue that the water on the road was caused by weather. It allowed, however, that there was a closer question about whether the road/water condition was temporary or had stabilized. The Court found that the since the water was still rising, the condition had not yet stabilized and was therefore still temporary. The Court found that the County attempted to address the flooding at the road site. Importantly, the Court found that the period of reasonable response “lasts at least until the condition stops worsening, in this case when the Yellow River crested.” As a consequence, the Court held that because the accident occurred during this period, immunity applies, regardless of the inadequacies in the County’s initial responses at the crash site.

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